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“Waiving” Goodbye to Medicaid as We 
Know It: Modern State Attempts to 
Transform Medicaid Programs 
Through Section 1115 Waivers 
Chandler Gray* 
Abstract 
This Note explores recent state efforts to reshape their 
respective Medicaid programs through Section 1115 waivers. 
Specifically, this Note looks at states that wish to convert their 
Medicaid program to a block grant through Section 1115 
waivers. Examining the lawfulness of these waivers requires 
analyzing the language and application of both the Medicaid Act 
and the Administrative Procedure Act. This Note argues that any 
use of Section 1115 waivers to implement a block grant program 
would be a violation of the Medicaid Act and thus unlawful. 
Further, federal approval of such programs would be deemed 
arbitrary and capricious. To justify this conclusion, this Note 
considers three recent federal court decisions striking down 
states’ use of Section 1115 waivers to enforce Medicaid work 
requirements. This Note determines that any use of Section 1115 
waivers to create a block grant program would face similar legal 
challenges as the work requirements cases. 
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I. Introduction 
Six-year-old Asher lives with a chronic lung disease that 
required hospitalization four times in 2019 alone.1 She depends 
on medication to help her breathe, and her family depends on 
Tennessee’s Medicaid program to assist with Asher’s medical 
coverage and costs.2 In October 2019, Asher’s mother, along 
with approximately sixty-five other Tennesseans, crowded into 
a public library in East Knoxville, Tennessee to voice their 
concerns over Tennessee’s proposal to convert its current 
Medicaid funding into a block grant.3 As part of this proposal, 
Tennessee plans to change some of its Medicaid benefits, 
including changing prescription drug coverage to exclude 
certain drugs.4 Asher’s mother spoke at the public forum to call 
attention to this particular feature of the block grant proposal, 
and criticized the lack of specificity in the proposal regarding an 
appeals process.5 Over the three days of public forums across 
the state, nobody spoke in favor of the block grant proposal.6 
Tennessee’s proposal, known as Amendment 42, is part of a 
recent movement by conservative states to reshape their 
 
 1. See Natalie Alison & Kristi Nelson, In Second Day of Public Hearings, 
No One Speaks in Favor of Tennessee’s Block Grant Plan, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 2, 
2019, 6:21 PM), https://perma.cc/4YN3-MVQP (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 9:51 
AM) (discussing the health challenges faced by Asher). 
 2. See Jessica Bliss, Lawmakers Discuss Ways to Support Families 
Raising Children with Severe Disabilities but Cost a Key Factor, TENNESSEAN 
(Feb. 28, 2019, 11:49 AM), https://perma.cc/X9DZ-X645 (last updated Feb. 28, 
2019, 12:00 PM) (explaining the financial hardship faced by many families of 
children with disabilities due to expensive medical care). 
 3. See Alison & Nelson, supra note 1 (noting that Tennessee’s 
government held a series of public forums on the block grant proposal). 
 4. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, TENNCARE II DEMONSTRATION: 
AMENDMENT 42, at 15 (2019), https://perma.cc/LK3A-G6LW (PDF) (discussing 
the changes Tennessee wishes to make to certain classes of prescription drug 
coverage). 
 5. See Alison & Nelson, supra note 1 (“[Asher’s mother] is concerned 
about the state’s plan to cover fewer drugs under the block grant in order to 
negotiate lower prices with drug companies.”). 
 6. See Brett Kelman & Adam Friedman, Tennessee’s Medicaid Block 
Grant: 3 Days, 3 Public Hearings, Zero Support, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 3, 2019, 
5:24 PM), https://perma.cc/9TMQ-C9Y5 (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 9:51 AM) 
(summarizing the results from the public hearings held by the Tennessee state 
government). 
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respective Medicaid programs.7 These states employ what are 
known as Section 1115 waivers (so named for their location 
within the Social Security Act)8 to propose demonstration 
projects that attempt to integrate market-based solutions to 
control Medicaid program costs.9 However, as this Note will 
argue, many of the Section 1115 waivers and subsequent 
demonstration projects set forth by these states, including 
Amendment 42, are unlawful.10 
Part II of this Note provides background information on the 
Medicaid Act as well as Section 1115 waivers. Part III examines 
two types of modern restrictive Section 1115 waiver programs: 
work requirements and block grants. This Note focuses on these 
two types of Section 1115 waivers because the Trump 
Administration is advocating for states to adopt these programs 
in its effort to transform Medicaid.11 Specifically, this Note 
scrutinizes Kentucky’s Section 1115 work requirements waiver, 
Kentucky HEALTH;12 Tennessee’s Section 1115 block grant 
proposal, Amendment 42;13  and the Trump Administration’s 
proposed Medicaid block grant program, Healthy Adult 
 
 7. See Allison Baker & Linda Hunt, Counterproductive Consequences of 
a Conservative Ideology: Medicaid Expansion and Personal Responsibility 
Requirements, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1181, 1181 (2016) (discussing the use 
of Section 1115 waivers by conservative states to alter their Medicaid 
programs rather than simply expanding Medicaid). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (permitting demonstration projects under 
the Medicaid Act). This Note will refer to Medicaid waivers granted under 
§ 1315 authority as “Section 1115” waivers. 
 9. See Baker & Hunt, supra note 7 (stating that conservative states use 
Section 1115 waivers to promote conservatives’ ideas about health care). 
 10. See Rachel Sachs & Nicole Huberfeld, The Problematic Law and 
Policy of Medicaid Block Grants, HEALTH AFF. (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc
/Q2DC-RBC7?type=image (arguing that many modern Section 1115 waivers 
are an attempt to bypass the law). 
 11. See id. (discussing the Trump Administration’s focus on the work 
requirement and block grant waivers). 
 12. See KY. DEP’T OF MEDICAID SERVS., KY. HEALTH DEMONSTRATION 4 
(2016), https://perma.cc/5WRZ-P764 (PDF) (providing an overview of the 
Kentucky HEALTH waiver). 
 13. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (providing 
Tennessee’s rationale for designing and requesting a block grant). 
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Opportunity (HAO).14 Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning 
from the Section 1115 work requirements cases Stewart v. 
Azar15 (Stewart II) and Gresham v. Azar16 (Gresham II) to 
illustrate how a court analyzes Section 1115 waiver proposals 
against both the Medicaid Act17 and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).18 Future litigation against Section 1115 
proposals such as Amendment 42 would likely raise similar 
arguments as those provided in the work requirements 
litigation.19 Thus, in Part V, this Note will apply the legal 
reasoning in the work requirements cases to the issue of Section 
1115 block grant proposals.20 This Note concludes by 
recommending that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (Secretary) refuse to approve Amendment 42 and any 
HAO waiver proposals. This Note also predicts that if the 
Secretary were to approve these waiver proposals, courts would 
strike down such approval as both arbitrary and capricious and 
in violation of the Medicaid Act. 
 
 14. See Letter from Calder Lynch, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs., SMD No. 20-001 
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/LF6E-76EH (PDF) (encouraging states to 
apply for Medicaid as a block grant through Section 1115 waivers). 
 15. 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 16. 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018) (creating the Medicaid program as part 
of the Social Security Act and requiring states to “furnish medical assistance” 
to populations in need). 
 18. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (discussing the general provisions of 
administrative practice). 
 19. See Leonard Cuello, Medicaid Waivers: Courts Must Step in When the 
Exception Becomes the Rule, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 892, 892 (2018) (arguing 
that Section 1115 grants HHS only narrow authority and does not permit the 
type of broad programs currently seen). But see Anthony Albanese, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Section 1115: Learning from History to Improve the 
Medicaid–Waiver Regime Today, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 827, 828 (2019) 
(arguing that Section 1115 grants permission to states to propose broad 
policies). 
 20. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (predicting that Section 1115 
block grant litigation will follow the same patterns as, and that the 
government will fail to meet the legal standard articulated in, the Section 1115 
work requirements litigation). 
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II. Background on the Medicaid Act and Section 1115 
A. The Medicaid Act 
In 1965, Congress passed the Medicaid Act as part of a 
monumental addition of health insurance programs to the 
Social Security Act (SSA).21 Medicaid provides medical 
assistance to “categorically needy” persons, defined as those 
needing public assistance based on “family circumstances, age, 
or disability.”22 The program depends on cooperative federalism, 
where the federal government provides open-ended matching 
funds to state Medicaid programs in exchange for compliance 
with federal requirements.23 These requirements ensure that 
states provide coverage to certain populations based on factors 
such as income, disability, and pregnancy status.24 The nature 
of Medicaid’s financing arrangement means that there is no 
pre-set limit to the amount of money paid by the federal 
 
 21. See Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2013) [hereinafter Endless Difficulties] 
(stating that Congress amended the SSA to simultaneously include both 
Medicare and Medicaid in response to calls for health insurance for the elderly 
and poor); see also Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (“The Medicaid [Act] is an aggravated assault on the English language, 
resistant to attempts to understand it.”). 
 22. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981); see CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & MEDICAID MILESTONES: 
1937 – 2015, at 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/H6ST-36C4 (PDF) (stating that 
Medicaid was originally passed to provide states “with the option of receiving 
federal funding for providing health care services to low-income children, their 
caretaker relatives, the blind, and individuals with disabilities”). 
 23. See Endless Difficulties, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing the Medicaid 
program as a carrot and stick arrangement between the federal government 
and the states); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Medicaid 
is a prototypical example of federal–state cooperation in serving the Nation’s 
general welfare.”). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2018) (detailing different categories of 
eligibility for Medicaid assistance); Malcolm J. Harkins, Be Careful What You 
Ask for: The Repeal of the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal 
Responsibility to Assure that State Medicaid Programs Pay for Cost Effective 
Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 162 (2002) 
(“States that choose to participate, however, must administer their Medicaid 
program in conformance with the Medicaid Act and applicable federal 
regulations.”). 
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government to the states.25 Further, this financing structure 
automatically adjusts state resources to account for 
“demographic and economic shifts, health care costs, public 
health emergencies, natural disasters and changing state 
priorities.”26 Currently, all states participate in the Medicaid 
program.27 The Medicaid program is designed to empower 
states with the ability to design and control their respective 
programs within the federally established parameters.28 
B. Section 1115 
Although congressional intent regarding Section 1115 is 
murky,29 Section 1115 waivers serve as opportunities for states 
to expand Medicaid eligibility to uninsured populations.30 
Specifically, Section 1115 waivers encourage states to design 
research and demonstration programs that “develop innovative 
solutions to a variety of health and welfare problems.”31 
 
 25. See Robin Rudowitz et al., KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID FINANCING: 
THE BASICS 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/AWR9-638M (PDF) [hereinafter THE 
BASICS] (providing an overview of Medicaid’s financing structure). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Endless Difficulties, supra note 21, at 15 (stating that every state 
participates in the Medicaid program and as a result of participation receives 
federal funds). 
 28. See Abbe Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in 
Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1693, 1711 (2018) (characterizing Medicaid 
as a “state-driven” health care program). 
 29. See Jonathan Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal 
and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the 
Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 99 (2003) (“Section 1115 
was enacted in 1962 with ‘virtually no legislative history’ to explain it.” (citing 
Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid 
Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 111 (1992)) [hereinafter Mothers and 
Children Last]. 
 30. See John Holahan et al., Insuring the Poor Through Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 1, 1995), https://perma.cc/H4PG-
J5V8?type=image (discussing ways states can expand the populations eligible 
for Medicaid as a way for states to enact state-level health reform). 
 31. Id. (discussing the unique characteristics of Section 1115 waivers as 
opposed to other methods by which states can expand Medicaid). See NICOLE 
HUBERFELD ET AL., THE LAW OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 93 (2d ed. 2018) 
(stating that the purpose of providing waivers is to encourage states to explore 
alternative ways of providing Medicaid coverage to beneficiaries while still 
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Although states use Section 1115 waivers to create state-specific 
policy approaches to improving Medicaid implementation in 
their respective states, the ultimate approval authority rests 
with the Secretary.32 The Secretary may “waive the 
requirements of specific sections in the [Medicaid Act]”33 so long 
as the state’s proposed programs are “likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives of the Medicaid program.”34 
Additionally, Section 1115 waivers and subsequent 
demonstration programs must be budget neutral to the federal 
government in order to receive approval.35 
The Trump Administration has approved a wide variety of 
Section 1115 waivers, including waivers to promote healthy 
behavior incentives, waivers that extend Medicaid eligibility to 
new populations with behavioral health needs, and a waiver to 
address social determinants of health.36 New administrations 
 
maintaining fidelity to Medicaid’s overarching purpose); About Section 1115 
Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/QZR5-
WZUR (describing the purpose of Section 1115 demonstration programs as 
finding state-specific policy solutions to serving Medicaid populations and 
introducing evidence-based solutions to promote better health outcomes). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (vesting approval authority in the 
Secretary). 
 33. Bolton, supra note 29, at 98 (discussing specific sections which the 
Secretary may not waive compliance to in granting a state’s Section 1115 
waiver). 
 34. About Section 1115 Waivers, supra note 31 (describing the balance 
between state-specific policies and federal oversight necessitated by Section 
1115 programs). 
 35. See Letter from Timothy B. Hill, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & 
CHIP Servs., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs., 
SMD No. 18-009 (Aug. 22, 2018) (Re: Budget Neutrality Policies for Section 
1115(a) Medicaid Demonstration Projects), https://perma.cc/3JV3-NLKP 
(PDF) (“A budget neutral demonstration project does not result in Medicaid 
costs to the federal government that are greater than what the federal 
government’s Medicaid costs would likely have been absent the 
demonstration.”); see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective 
Federal-State Partnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 911 
(1999) (stating that the budget neutrality rule gained prominence due to a 
Clinton administration policy change that encouraged the use of Section 1115 
waivers to expand the Medicaid population). 
 36. See Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration 
Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/W5FP-ZSKW (describing the 
wide variety in approved Section 1115 waivers during the Trump 
Administration). 
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tend to build on the Section 1115 waiver trends of previous 
administrations when approving new waiver requests, as well 
as continuing ongoing Section 1115 waiver programs.37 
Legal challenges to Section 1115 waivers usually focus on 
the requirement that the Secretary only approve those Section 
1115 waivers that promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act.38 
However, courts generally interpret Section 1115 as granting 
broad approval authority to the Secretary as long as the 
Secretary indicates that the waiver will promote the objectives 
of the Medicaid Act.39 
III. Examination of Restrictive Modern Section 1115 Waiver 
Programs 
A. Work Requirements 
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,40 
Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to include adults under 
sixty-five years old whose income did not exceed 138 percent of 
the federal poverty line.41 In 2012, the United States Supreme 
 
 37. See id. (noting that the Trump Administration continued approving 
“eligibility- and enrollment-related waiver provisions” approved by the Obama 
Administration). 
 38. See Bolton, supra note 29, at 100–02 (stating that historically courts 
have been “unwilling to limit the scope of the Secretary’s power to approve 
waivers”). 
 39. Mothers and Children Last, supra note 29, at 111 (emphasizing that 
courts will not interfere so long as the Secretary has made legitimate findings 
and followed the appropriate processes). See C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1996) (viewing the Secretary’s 
consideration of relevant factors in approving the Section 1115 waiver at issue 
and compilation of a robust record to be sufficient as a valid exercise of the 
Secretary’s powers); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1106–07 (2d Cir. 
1973) (stating that the Secretary need only review sufficient materials to 
decide whether the Section 1115 program is “likely” to promote the objectives 
of Medicaid). But see Greater N.Y. Hosp. Assoc. v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 234, 243 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that the Secretary’s approval of the Section 1115 
program approved the waiver of a provision of the Medicaid Act which the 
Secretary, under § 1315, was not permitted to waive); Cuello, supra note 19, 
at 892 (arguing that Section 1115 grants HHS only narrow authority and does 
not permit the type of broad programs currently seen). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018) (providing for Medicaid 
expansion starting in 2014). 
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Court ruled that Medicaid expansion was optional for states to 
participate in, rather than mandatory.42 Although many states 
have still not expanded Medicaid,43 several conservative states 
have used Section 1115 waivers to expand Medicaid eligibility 
to certain populations while implementing conservative 
reforms.44 
Within the past four years, many states requested and 
received approval for Section 1115 waiver programs that 
include work requirements for able-bodied Medicaid 
recipients.45 Although this work requirement policy was 
proposed in the past,46 previous administrations refused to 
approve such waivers.47 The Trump Administration signaled its 
 
 42. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 587 (2012) 
(stating that states may voluntarily sign up to participate in Medicaid 
expansion, but that the federal government cannot force the states to accept 
expansion). 
 43. See Status of State Action on Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/G4SX-WWP9 (stating that 14 states have not 
expanded Medicaid at the time of this writing). 
 44. See Andrew Prokop, The Battle Over Medicaid Expansion in 2013 and 
2014, Explained, VOX, https://perma.cc/YFL3-VQYP (last updated May 12, 
2015) (detailing the conservative states that requested Section 1115 waivers 
to implement conservative reforms to their respective Medicaid programs). 
 45. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 
Waivers by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/54F8-9MMQ (stating 
that the states with Medicaid work requirements are Arkansas, Indiana, 
Kentucky, and New Hampshire). 
 46. See Laura Hermer, What to Expect When You’re 
Expecting . . . TANF-Style Medicaid Waivers, 27 ANN. HEALTH L. 37, 37–38 
(2018) [hereinafter What to Expect] (providing examples of previously 
suggested work requirement policies to combat negative stereotypes about the 
typical Medicaid recipient); see also IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP 2.0 
SECTION 1115 WAIVER APPLICATION (2014), https://perma.cc/GU7Z-3SAH 
(PDF) (proposing a Section 1115 waiver to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) that would require certain subpopulations of 
Medicaid beneficiaries to work a certain number of hours in order to receive 
their benefits). 
 47. See Letter from Vikki Wachino, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Jeffrey A. Meyers, Comm’r, N.H. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/E4S5-8BR2 
(PDF) (explaining that CMS will not approve demonstration projects that 
include work requirements because such requirements do not further the 
objectives of the Medicaid Act); Jessica Greene, What Medicaid Recipients and 
Other Low-Income Adults Think About Medicaid Work Requirements, HEALTH 
AFF. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/44DB-KS7F?type=image (stating that 
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amenability to approving Section 1115 waivers that 
implemented work requirements in state Medicaid programs, 
and the Administration even solicited such waiver proposals.48 
Medicaid work requirements generally apply to able-bodied 
adults within the Medicaid expansion population49 and require 
beneficiaries to verify their participation in activities such as 
“employment, job search, or job training programs, for a certain 
number of hours per week.”50 Many legal scholars believe that 
work requirements do not further the objectives of the Medicaid 
Act because they are not directly related to providing medical 
assistance to people.51 The reporting requirements for work 
requirements are often difficult for Medicaid beneficiaries to 
meet due to lack of access to technology or difficulty 
understanding technology.52 Failure to properly comply with the 
 
the Obama Administration did not approve work requirements because they 
threatened access to medical care). 
 48. See Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs., SMD No. 18-002 
(Jan. 11, 2018) (Re: Opportunities to Promote Work and Community 
Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries), https://perma.cc/HMT3-RB5J 
(PDF) (explaining that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
will now support state efforts to attach a work requirement to receipt of 
Medicaid benefits pursuant to a Section 1115 waiver, signaling a reversal in 
policy from previous administrations who would deny such requirements). 
 49. See Joy Madubuonwu et al., Work Requirements in Kentucky 
Medicaid: A Policy in Limbo, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2019), https://
perma.cc/CU6X-5WJL (stating that the work requirements portion of 
Kentucky HEALTH would apply to only nonelderly, non-disabled adults which 
is the typical population covered by Medicaid expansion). 
 50. Rachel Garfield et al., Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid 
and Work: What Does the Data Say?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/W6ZM-6C94. 
 51. See Sara Rosenbaum, Invented Purposes and Blue Sky Predictions: 
Why the Trump Administration Cannot Win the Medicaid Work Experiment 
Cases, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 113, 118 (2019) [hereinafter Invented Purposes] 
(highlighting that Section 1115 demonstrations are confined to those projects 
which are likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act); Sidney D. 
Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: Reigning in HHS Overreach, 46 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 887, 888 (2018) (arguing that the core objective of Medicaid is 
to “provide health insurance for those who qualify for it” and that work 
requirements reduce coverage for many beneficiaries). 
 52. See Garfield et al., supra note 50 (“Many Medicaid enrollees face 
barriers to work such as functional disabilities, serious medical conditions, 
school attendance, and care-taking responsibilities. Many Medicaid adults do 
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reporting requirements could cause beneficiaries to lose their 
Medicaid coverage, even though 63 percent of nonelderly adults 
on Medicaid are already working.53 The Secretary’s approval of 
Section 1115 work requirement waivers triggered immediate 
litigation from Medicaid beneficiaries alleging unlawful 
approval.54 
B. Block Grants 
Conservative proposals to reform America’s health care 
system often include changing the Medicaid funding structure 
from the current open-ended funding to block grants.55 Block 
grants use a capped spending model where the federal 
government grants a lump sum of money to a state for a specific 
program and vests control and oversight of the program in the 
state rather than the federal government.56 Other welfare 
programs use federal block grants, such as the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.57 Congress 
created the TANF block grant in 1996 to provide states with a 
 
not use computers, the internet or email, which could be a barrier in finding a 
job or complying with policies to report work or exemption status.”). 
 53. See id. (“Most Medicaid adults are already working; among those who 
are not working, most report barriers to work.”). 
 54. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Rose v. Azar, No. 1:19-cv-02848 (D.D.C. Sept. 
23, 2019). See Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at 
*5 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2019) (stating that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in approving this Section 1115 waiver, failed to consider the relevant 
factors as required by the APA); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169 
(D.D.C. 2019) (same); Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135–36 (D.D.C. 
2019) (same). 
 55. See Vikki Wachino & Tim Gronniger, The Insufficiency of Medicaid 
Block Grants: The Example of Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/P5X9-63T5?type=image (“Medicaid block grants have been a 
centerpiece of Republican health proposals for more than a decade.”); see also 
Shefali Luthra, Everything You Need to Know About Block Grants – The Heart 
of GOP’s Medicaid Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://
perma.cc/V7RV-UKZA (finding that Republican proposals to change Medicaid 
to a block grant program date back to the Reagan Administration). 
 56. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (“A block grant scheme would 
be very different from Medicaid’s statutorily required open-ended funding.”); 
Luthra, supra note 55 (stating that a Medicaid block grant scheme would 
involve “turning control of the program to states and capping what the federal 
government spends on it each year”). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2018). 
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greater degree of independence and flexibility in spending 
federal dollars.58 However, many states have used the flexibility 
over TANF funds to shift the money to other parts of the state 
budget that do not directly help poor families.59 Further, 
TANF’s block grant structure does not account for inflation, 
resulting in TANF having lost “one-third of its value since 
1997.”60 Another federal program that receives its funding 
through block grants is the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP).61 Congress must renew CHIP’s block grant 
every five years, leading to ongoing difficulties in ensuring the 
block grant is reauthorized in a timely manner.62 Further, 
states often spend in excess of their allotted block grant portion, 
requiring additional federal funding to provide consistent 
coverage.63 
For Medicaid specifically, a block grant program could take 
several forms, including states receiving a pre-determined 
amount of money from the federal government, or states 
receiving a sum of money based on the number of Medicaid 
 
 58. See What to Expect, supra note 46, at 42–43 (“[S]tates also maintain 
considerable discretion to decide how to spend their block grants, whether on 
cash welfare to TANF recipients, work and training support, marriage 
promotion activities, child protective services, or otherwise.”). 
 59. See LIZ SCHOTT ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOW 
STATES USE FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDS UNDER THE TANF BLOCK GRANT 1 
(2015), https://perma.cc/Z98Q-MGQ4 (PDF) (“TANF’s combination of broadly 
defined purposes and limited accountability for much of its spending has 
enabled states to divert funds from supporting the poorest families and use 
them instead to help fill state budget holes.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. § 1397aa. 
 62. See Laura Hermer, Hot Topics in Healthcare Compliance: Engage 
with Leaders: Medicaid: Welfare Program of Last Resort, or Safety Net?, 44 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2018) (noting that CHIP faces struggles in 
“winning congressional reauthorization”); see also Sarah Kliff, CHIP is Finally 
Getting Funded–After 114 Days Without a Budget, VOX (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
perma.cc/X8AM-LNBF (“Congress let CHIP’s long-term funding lapse 114 
days ago.”). 
 63. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
431, 472 (2011) (noting that many states struggle with budgeting and 
spending block grant money appropriately). 
110 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020) 
 
beneficiaries in that state.64 Under either model, the state would 
also gain greater control over the Medicaid program.65 
In early 2020, the Trump Administration released guidance 
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
indicating that the federal government is willing to receive 
Section 1115 waivers requesting Medicaid as a block grant.66 
This initiative, called the Healthy Adult Opportunity (HAO), 
would allow states to receive a lump sum of money to cover the 
Medicaid expansion population and other non-disabled adults.67  
States would choose whether to receive the money under a per 
capita annual federal spending cap, calculated on the number of 
Medicaid enrollees multiplied by the “maximum allowable 
spending per person,” or an aggregate annual federal spending 
cap, which would apply to the state regardless of fluctuations in 
Medicaid enrollment.68 The block grant would require less 
federal oversight and provide states with the ability to limit 
available benefits as well as impose cost-sharing mechanisms 
on beneficiaries.69 Health law experts predict that any proposals 
under the HAO initiative would face a “pretty quick litigation 
response” since the initiative likely violates the Medicaid Act.70 
 
 64. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (describing the potential 
structure of a Medicaid block grant). 
 65. See Eliot Fishman & Joe Weissfeld, Medicaid Policy and Partisan 
Politics: A New Dynamic, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/J88K-
9R9Z/?type=image (using Tennessee as an example of a state asking for 
Medicaid as a block grant with minimal federal oversight on spending). 
 66. See Lynch, supra note 14 (encouraging states to apply for Medicaid 
as a block grant through Section 1115 waivers). 
 67. See id. (discussing the structure of the Healthy Adult Opportunity 
initiative). 
 68. See Robin Rudowitz et al., Implications of CMS’s New “Healthy Adult 
Opportunity” Demonstrations for Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://perma.cc/25ZW-9GSG [hereinafter Implications] (detailing the 
difference in the two spending cap options available to states under HAO). 
 69. See id. (stating that this new initiative would be a change from past 
Medicaid proposals due to relaxing coverage requirements and federal 
oversight). 
 70. See Shira Stein, Medicaid Block Grant Policy Could Face High Legal 
Hurdles, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/LJ2H-7QZU (stating 
that the Healthy Adult Opportunity initiative is trying to waive many 
unwaivable parts of the Medicaid Act). 
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Congress intended for Section 1115 waivers to test 
innovations in Medicaid delivery.71 However, changing 
Medicaid funding to a block grant would represent a marked 
departure from past Medicaid proposals despite Section 1115’s 
innovative nature.72 While Section 1115 permits the Secretary 
to waive compliance with several parts of the Medicaid Act,73 
the Secretary cannot waive Section 1903, as would be required 
for a successful block grant demonstration.74 Section 1903 
delineates the funding structure of Medicaid, including the 
required unlimited federal matching system.75 Many legal 
scholars argue that shifting Medicaid to a block grant program 
would raise similar arguments as the work requirements 
litigation because both programs violate the Medicaid Act.76 As 
the first Section 1115 block grant proposal to move to the final 
round of approval by the CMS, Amendment 42 serves as test 
case for these block grant proposals.77 
 
 71. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (identifying Section 1115 
waivers as the most likely way for the government to experiment with 
providing Medicaid as a block grant). 
 72. See Implications, supra note 68 (characterizing the Trump 
Administration’s chosen policy changes to Medicaid, such as block grants, as 
marking a “new direction for Medicaid demonstrations”). 
 73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (listing the specific provisions in the 
Medicaid Act that the Secretary may waive in approving a Section 1115 
demonstration project). 
 74. Id. § 1396b. 
 75. See id. (discussing the payment system to states); see also Sachs & 
Huberfeld, supra note 10 (hypothesizing that the non-waivable nature of 
Section 1903 presents a death knell to block grants). 
 76. See Sara Rosenbaum, What a Medicaid Block Grant Would Mean for 
Tennessee: An Update, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 30, 2019), https://perma.cc
/GE6T-ARX2 (last updated Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter An Update] 
(hypothesizing that, if the Secretary were to approve a block grant waiver, 
many of the litigation strategies would mirror those of the work requirements 
cases); Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (arguing that changing Medicaid to 
block grants is unlawful because it violates the language of Section 1115); 
Nicholas Bagley, Tennessee Wants to Block Grant Medicaid. Is That Legal?, 
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST, (Sept. 17, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://perma.cc/EJD4-
GTC6 (doubting the ability of states to use Section 1115 waivers to alter 
Medicaid’s financing structure). 
 77. See Letter from Andrea J. Cash, Dir., Div. of Coverage & Expansion 
Demonstrations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to John G. Roberts, 
Comm’r, Div. of TennCare, Tenn. State Gov’t (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc
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C. Comparing Amendment 42 with the Healthy Adult 
Opportunity Program 
The Tennessee government wrote Amendment 42 in the 
context of the current leadership of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and CMS.78 Since taking control in 2017, the Trump 
Administration has signaled that HHS and CMS are amenable 
to Section 1115 waiver proposals that previously would not have 
been approved.79 Part of this shift is the Administration’s desire 
to give more power over the Medicaid program to the states, 
rather than consolidating that power in CMS.80 Thus, 
Tennessee proposed a Medicaid program in which the state 
would receive Medicaid funding in the form of a block grant.81 
Additionally, Tennessee’s state legislature passed a bill 
requiring the state’s Medicaid agency to submit a proposal to 
CMS asking to receive its Medicaid funds as a block grant.82 
 
/88H6-LGPN (PDF) (indicating that Tennessee’s Amendment 42 proposal met 
the requirements for a Section 1115 demonstration project submission and 
would move to the next phase in obtaining CMS approval); see also Brett 
Kelman & Joel Ebert, TennCare and the Trump Administration Have 
Drastically Different Block Grant Plans, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 30, 2020), https://
perma.cc/QM22-ZAVQ (highlighting that Tennessee is the first state to ask 
CMS for a block grant for the state’s Medicaid funding). 
 78. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (stating Tennessee’s 
rationale for moving to a block grant system); see also Stephanie Armour, 
Tennessee Becomes First State to Embrace Block Grants for Medicaid Funding, 
WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/7RMJ-JHNT (last updated May 7, 2019, 2:46 
PM) (noting that Tennessee is seeking approval from HHS and CMS of its 
Section 1115 waiver to convert the state’s Medicaid program to a block grant). 
 79. See Neale, supra note 48 (explaining that CMS will now support state 
efforts to attach a work requirement to receipt of Medicaid benefits pursuant 
to a Section 1115 waiver, signaling a reversal in policy from previous 
administrations who would deny such requirements). 
 80. See id. (“Each state is different, and states are in the best position to 
determine which approaches are most likely to succeed, based on their specific 
populations and resources.”). 
 81. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (discussing the 
reasons Tennessee feels Amendment 42 serves the best interests of the state). 
But see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Inside Tennessee’s Final 1115 Medicaid Block 
Grant Proposal, HEALTH AFF. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/B7X2-
NTFU?type=image (“According to the Nashville Tennessean, the original 
proposal drew over 1800 public comments, 11 of them positive.”). 
 82. See Letter from John G. Roberts, Comm’r, Div. of TennCare, Tenn. 
State Gov’t, to Randy McNally, Lieutenant Governor & Speaker of the Senate, 
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Specifically, the proposed amendment explicitly requests to 
change Tennessee’s Medicaid program into a block grant.83 
Tennessee wishes to pursue this change because of freedom 
from federal oversight afforded to the state through a block 
grant.84 The proposal pushes for broad state authority over 
benefit reduction and expansion,85 exemption from any 
potential future federal mandates regarding Medicaid coverage, 
86 the ability to spend (or not spend) any expenditure as the state 
wishes,87 and exemption from federal oversight processes, 
including federal review of the demonstration.88 Critics note the 
proposal is “long on generalized arguments and rhetorical 
positioning and short on detail.”89 Although legal advocacy 
organizations asked CMS to refrain from approving 
Amendment 42 until Tennessee provided more detail,90 CMS 
 
Tenn. Gen. Assembly, & Cameron Sexton, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Tenn. Gen. Assembly, (Sept. 17, 2019) (Re: TennCare 
Amendment 42 Submission), https://perma.cc/4SGF-KRLJ (PDF) (“In 2019, 
the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Public Chapter No. 481, directing 
TennCare to submit a waiver amendment to CMS to provide medical 
assistance to the TennCare population by means of a block grant.”). 
 83. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 4 (“The proposed 
demonstration will transform the traditional Medicaid financing structure in 
Tennessee to a block grant.”). 
 84. See id. at 13 (explaining Tennessee’s reasoning for making this 
request to the federal government). 
 85. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 81 (“[T]he state continues to 
position itself to reduce coverage within any benefit category.”). 
 86. See id. (“[T]he state continues to seek exemption from ‘any new 
federal mandates over the life of the demonstration that could have a material 
impact on the state’s Medicaid expenditures’ offering examples such as 
mandated eligibility and benefit expansions.”). 
 87. See id. (stating that non-expenditure of federal program surpluses 
can be an issue). 
 88. See id. (“The state also . . . seeks extensive waivers of the federal 
oversight process, including approval of managed care contracts, state 
arrangements with MCOs on delivery system reforms, limits on risk 
contracting, and federal certification of actuarially sound capitation rates.”). 
 89. Id. For the state’s perspective on this point, see TENN. DIV. OF 
TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that the state will not “enumerate in 
detail in this document every innovation, reform, or policy change that might 
take place over the life of the demonstration, since the purpose of the block 
grant is precisely to give the state a range of autonomy . . . .”). 
 90. See Letter from Jane Perkins, Legal Dir., Nat’l Health Law Program, 
to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Nov. 26, 2019) 
 
114 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020) 
 
issued a letter stating that Tennessee’s new Section 1115 waiver 
was in the final stages of approval.91 
Amendment 42 differs from the HAO program in that the 
programs target different populations of Medicaid 
beneficiaries.92 Amendment 42 would impact the entire 
Medicaid beneficiary population in Tennessee, while the HAO 
program would focus only on the Medicaid expansion population 
of healthy, non-disabled adults.93 The Medicaid expansion 
population consists of childless adults aged 19–64 with incomes 
under 138 percent of the federal poverty line who generally do 
not have a complex medical condition or disability that would 
otherwise make them eligible for Medicaid.94 In contrast, 
Amendment 42 would impact all 1.6 million people enrolled in 
Tennessee’s Medicaid program, including children with special 
needs, nursing home residents, and people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities.95 Thus, Amendment 42 would have 
a much wider impact on low-income and disabled individuals 
requiring medical assistance than the HAO program would 
have on the expansion population.96 Since Tennessee has not 
 
(Re: TennCare II Demonstration), https://perma.cc/8WHE-J8EF (PDF) (“[W]e 
ask that CMS not issue a letter of completeness until the State submits a 
waiver application with sufficient content and specificity to allow for 
meaningful public review and comment.”). 
 91. See Cash, supra note 77 (indicating that Tennessee’s Amendment 42 
proposal met the requirements for a Section 1115 demonstration project 
submission and would move to the next phase in obtaining CMS approval). 
 92. See Kelman & Ebert, supra note 77 (stating that the Healthy Adult 
Opportunity initiative has a much narrower focus than Amendment 42). 
 93. See id. (“TennCare and the federal government have dramatically 
different visions for how block grants can be used to transform Medicaid 
programs. Both visions would cap funding in exchange for giving states more 
authority over Medicaid, but the people who would be affected are not the 
same.”). 
 94. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Medicaid Matters: Crafting a 
Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 KY. L.J. 381, 394 (2013) (discussing 
the demographics of the Medicaid expansion population as generally 
low-income, working adults). 
 95. See Medicaid’s Role in Tennessee, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jul. 21, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/WS6T-DQUN (discussing the demographics that make up 
Tennessee’s Medicaid population). 
 96. See Kelman & Ebert, supra note 77 (noting the differences in the 
populations affected by Amendment 42 and the Healthy Adult Opportunity 
program). 
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chosen to expand Medicaid, the HAO program would have 
limited reach in the state.97 
IV. Recent Case Law on Section 1115 Waiver Programs 
Before approving Medicaid block grants, the federal 
government should carefully evaluate whether such programs 
satisfy the objectives of the Medicaid Act or comply with the 
APA.98 As mentioned earlier, Section 1115 litigation looks to 
whether the program in question advances the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act and thus whether the Secretary was justified in 
his approval.99 The fundamental requirement that Section 1115 
waivers promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act applies to all 
types of waiver programs, making the courts’ reasoning in the 
work requirements cases instructive to future block grant 
cases.100 
In 2018, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia issued its first full Section 1115 waiver opinion in 
Stewart v. Azar101 (Stewart I) in which the district court vacated 
the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky HEALTH.102 After 
providing the Secretary with the opportunity to reconsider his 
approval of Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver, the district court 
again struck down the Secretary’s approval of the work 
requirements waiver in 2019 in Stewart II.103 On the same day, 
the district court issued another Section 1115 work 
requirements decision in Gresham v. Azar104 (Gresham I) where 
 
 97. See id. (stating that Tennessee has not expanded Medicaid). 
 98. See An Update, supra note 76 (hypothesizing that any legal challenge 
to block grants would likely follow the same formula as the legal challenges to 
work requirements). 
 99. See supra Part I. 
 100. See An Update, supra note 76 (discussing the similarities between the 
Section 1115 waivers for work requirements and a Section 1115 waiver for 
block grants). 
 101. 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 102. See id. at 273 (finding that the Secretary’s failure to consider the 
effect of Kentucky HEALTH on providing medical coverage voided the 
Secretary’s approval). 
 103. See Stewart v. Azar (Stewart II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130–31 (D.D.C. 
2019) (discussing the procedural history of this case since the Secretary 
approved Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver in 2018). 
 104. 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019). 
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the court relied on its reasoning in both Stewart I and Stewart 
II to strike down Arkansas’s Section 1115 work requirement 
waiver.105 In early 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously affirmed the 
district court’s rulings in the Section 1115 work requirements 
cases in Gresham v. Azar (Gresham II).106 
A. Stewart v. Azar 
In 2016, Kentucky sought approval from CMS for the first 
Section 1115 demonstration project that would impose work 
requirements on able-bodied Medicaid beneficiaries, titled 
Kentucky HEALTH.107 Since Kentucky received approval, 
seventeen other states, including Arkansas, have filed Section 
1115 waivers seeking to incorporate work requirements into 
their Medicaid programs.108 The Secretary’s approval of these 
Section 1115 demonstration projects prompted Medicaid 
beneficiaries in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, and New 
Hampshire to file suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia against the federal government for 
bypassing “the legislative process and act[ing] unilaterally to 
fundamentally transform Medicaid” as well as for violation of 
the APA.109 
In 2018, sixteen Kentucky Medicaid beneficiaries brought 
suit against HHS and CMS for allegedly violating the APA by 
 
 105. See id. at 172–73 (discussing the role of the Kentucky cases in the 
court’s decision striking down the Arkansas work requirements). 
 106. See Gresham v. Azar (Gresham II), 950 F.3d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(agreeing with the district court that the Secretary’s approval of the Section 
1115 work requirements waivers was arbitrary and capricious). 
 107. See Letter from Matthew Bevin, Gov., Ky., to Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/JTV3-6CL7 
(PDF) (requesting approval from HHS for the Section 1115 demonstration 
project). 
 108. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 
Waivers by State, supra note 45 (detailing the number of Section 1115 waivers 
by topic). 
 109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 54, at 1; see Philbrick v. Azar, No. 
19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *5 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2019) (stating 
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in approving this Section 
1115 waiver, failed to consider the relevant factors as required by the APA); 
Gresham I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (same); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 
135 – 36 (same). 
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approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver imposing work 
requirements on the Medicaid population.110 Initially, the 
district court issued an opinion denying the federal 
government’s request to transfer the suit to the Eastern District 
of Kentucky.111 A few months later, the district court issued an 
opinion denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 
remanded the issue back to HHS for an additional 
notice-and-comment period.112 Finally, the district court heard 
the case again after the Secretary approved Kentucky’s Section 
1115 program a second time.113 
In striking down Kentucky’s Section 1115 program, the 
district court evaluated two arguments: one, that the Secretary 
violated the Medicaid Act by improperly approving Kentucky’s 
program; and two, the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky’s 
program violated the APA because the Secretary acted in a way 
that was arbitrary and capricious.114 
1. The Medicaid Act 
The objective of the Medicaid Act is to provide medical 
assistance to people “whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.”115 
 
 110. See Stewart v. Azar, 308 F. Supp. 3d 239, 242 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(discussing the factual background of the case). 
 111. See id. at 250 (denying the defendants’ request to transfer the case to 
Kentucky district court). 
 112. See Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 272–74 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing 
the appropriate remedy in this scenario as remanding back to the agency for 
continued deliberation). 
 113. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 131 (“Plaintiffs now challenge the 
reapproval, contending principally that the Secretary has not remedied the 
defects that rendered his prior action unlawful. Specifically, they maintain 
that he has still not adequately considered Kentucky HEALTH’s likelihood to 
cause significant coverage loss.”). 
 114. See id. at 135 (discussing two of the arguments that plaintiffs make 
against defendants’ actions); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that arbitrary and 
capricious action occurs when “the agency entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency”). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). See Covenant Health Sys. v. Sebelius, 820 
F. Supp. 2d 4, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“According to the Medicaid statute, ‘medical 
assistance’ is ‘payment of part or all of the cost’ of medical ‘care and services’ 
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The court in Stewart II stated that courts define medical 
assistance as “payment in part or all of the costs of medical care 
and services for a defined set of individuals.”116 During oral 
arguments for Stewart II, the federal government conceded that 
this objective of Medicaid applies equally to the expansion 
population.117 
The Medicaid Act requires that the Secretary only approve 
demonstration projects that support the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act.118 The statute thus makes clear that the 
responsibility is on the Secretary to exercise his or her best 
judgment on whether the proposed project is likely to promote 
the objectives of Medicaid.119 
In Stewart II, the Secretary argued that there are three 
main objectives of the Medicaid Act in addition to providing 
medical assistance to the needy: 1) promoting health, 2) 
financial independence, and 3) fiscal sustainability.120 The 
district court evaluated each of these purported objectives in 
 
for a defined set of individuals.’ This defined group of individuals consists of 
patients who fall within one of thirteen categories of individuals to whom 
states may (or must) extend Medicaid benefits.”). 
 116. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Adena 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (providing the 
statutory definition of medical assistance); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980) (“The Medicaid program was created . . . for the purpose of 
providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse 
certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.”). 
 117. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 138–39 (referencing the federal 
government’s agreement that the purposes of Medicaid apply to the expansion 
population in question in Kentucky). 
 118. See § 1315 (discussing the requirements for the Secretary’s approval 
of demonstration projects); see also Invented Purposes, supra note 51, at 
115– 16 (examining Stewart with an emphasis on the purpose of the Medicaid 
Act). 
 119. See § 1315 (stating that the Secretary has final approval of each 
demonstration project). 
 120. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (discussing the Secretary’s 
inclusion of more than the single objective of the Medicaid Act); see also Letter 
from Paul Mango, Chief Principal Deputy Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., to Carol H. Steckel, Commissioner, Ky. Dep’t for Medicaid 
Servs., (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/M6CF-MZFZ (PDF) (discussing 
CMS’s position on the objectives of the Medicaid program in light of the earlier 
Stewart cases). 
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turn, starting with the objective of furnishing medical 
assistance.121 
a. Furnishing Medical Assistance 
The court found that the objective of furnishing medical 
assistance had two elements: “whether the project would cause 
recipients to lose coverage” and “whether the project would help 
promote coverage.”122 In order to be “legally adequate,” the 
Secretary’s approval of a Section 1115 waiver program must 
include an adequate analysis of the effect of the program on 
Medicaid coverage.123 The district court did not propose a 
bright-line test for satisfying these two elements but rather 
suggested that a court would need to employ a more fact-specific 
determination when evaluating whether the Secretary has 
satisfied these elements.124 The Secretary is not required to 
know the exact number of Medicaid beneficiaries who will be 
affected by the Secretary’s approval of the program.125 In terms 
of coverage promotion, the district court looked for evidence that 
the Secretary had weighed the Section 1115 waiver program’s 
 
 121. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (stating that the district court 
will examine each of the Secretary’s assertions that the three added objectives 
of the Medicaid Act are valid and can be used to justify approval of Kentucky 
HEALTH). 
 122. See id. at 140 (quoting Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C. 
2018)) (restating the district court’s findings from the previous proceeding 
about the elements of the first objective of the Medicaid Act). 
 123. See id. (suggesting that the Secretary is required to provide a 
numerical estimate of how many people would lose their Medicaid coverage as 
a result of the Section 1115 waiver program); see also Am. Wild Horse Pres. 
Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (providing another 
instance where the court looked for a Secretary’s adequate analysis when 
changing course in an agency’s decision-making). 
 124. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (focusing on the specific number 
of beneficiaries enrolled in Kentucky’s Medicaid program that would be 
affected by Kentucky HEALTH to determine the outcome of the coverage 
elements). 
 125. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (“As the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged when a petitioner challenged the potential imprecision of an 
agency’s numbers, even “in the best of circumstances,” the agency “has no 
access to infallible data.” (quoting Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 
1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2010))). 
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coverage promotion against the quantified coverage loss.126 The 
district court evaluated the Secretary’s actions against these 
two elements of furnishing medical assistance.127 
b. Promoting Beneficiary Health 
Upon reapproval of Kentucky HEALTH, the Secretary 
argued that promoting health was a standalone objective of the 
Medicaid program.128 The district court applied the Chevron129 
two-step analysis to the Secretary’s interpretation of health as 
an objective of the Medicaid Act.130 The district court concluded 
that the Secretary’s inclusion of health as an objective “fails at 
step two [of the Chevron analysis] because it falls outside ‘the 
 
 126. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (“In light of the failure to weigh 
any coverage promotion in the face of the likelihood of substantial coverage 
loss, the Secretary did not ‘adequately analyze the . . . consequences’ of the 
[waiver] reapproval.”). 
 127. See id. at 139 (discussing the Secretary’s actions in light of the 
Medicaid objective of furnishing medical assistance). 
 128. See Mango, supra note 120 (“But there is little intrinsic value in 
paying for [Medicaid] services if those services are not advancing the health 
and wellness of the individual receiving them.”); see also Stewart I, 313 F. 
Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing the Secretary’s argument that 
health promotion is a core objective of the Medicaid Act). 
 129. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 130. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 144 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that 
the court must apply the Chevron test to the Secretary’s articulation of 
Medicaid’s objectives); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (providing the 
standard by which agency interpretation of a statute is measured) 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which 
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is 
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the 
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of 
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
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bounds of reasonableness.’”131 To make this determination, the 
district court looked to Congress’s intent behind enacting the 
Medicaid Act as well as the Affordable Care Act to decide that 
the Secretary’s addition of “health” to the objectives of Medicaid 
was erroneous, finding that Congress and the Affordable Care 
Act sought to make health care more affordable for needy 
populations.132 The Secretary’s broadening of the Medicaid Act 
objectives to include “health” was impermissible.133 
c. Promoting Beneficiary Financial Independence 
The district court addressed the Secretary’s contention that 
another objective of the Medicaid Act was granting Medicaid 
beneficiaries greater understanding of financial independence 
in a similar manner as the Secretary’s other arguments.134 
Applying Chevron, the district court found that the Secretary’s 
assertion that financial independence is part of furnishing 
medical assistance was an unreasonable reading of Section 
1115.135 It is necessary for an agency to ground its 
interpretation of objectives of congressional acts in a statutory 
 
 131. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“[T]he Court cannot sustain 
the Secretary’s generalization of health from the Act’s objective of furnishing 
medical care.” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 
1990))). 
 132. See id. (looking to Congressional intent behind enactment of the 
Medicaid Act and Affordable Care Act); see also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 
267 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[Congress] . . . had an interest in making health care more 
affordable for such people.”). 
 133. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“The Secretary is not free 
instead to extrapolate the objectives of the statute to a higher level of 
generality and pursue that aim in the way he prefers.”). 
 134. See id. at 145 (discussing the Secretary’s inclusion of promoting 
beneficiary financial independence as a Medicaid objective). 
 135. See id. at 146 (“As the Court found before, financial self-sufficiency is 
not an independent objective of the Act and, as such, cannot undergird the 
Secretary’s finding under [Section 1115] that the project promotes the Act’s 
goals.”); see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The 
‘reasonableness’ of an agency’s construction depends,” in part, “on the 
construction’s ‘fit’ with the statutory language, as well as its conformity to 
statutory purposes.” (quoting Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990))). 
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basis.136 The state whose population is affected by the 
Secretary’s approval of a program may offer justifications for an 
agency’s approval of a program, but if the Secretary does not 
specifically rely on those assertions when approving the 
program, the state’s argument does not carry weight in the 
court’s consideration.137 Specifically in the Medicaid context, the 
agency is still obligated to weigh the potential costs of Medicaid 
coverage against the benefits of promoting the financial 
independence of beneficiaries.138 
d. Ensuring Fiscal Sustainability of the Medicaid Program 
In approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver, the Secretary 
stated that such demonstration projects give states a way to 
experiment with policies that “ensure the fiscal sustainability of 
the Medicaid program,” which then enables the state to provide 
medical assistance to a wider range of populations.139 The 
Secretary reasoned that approving Kentucky HEALTH saved 
Kentucky money in the long-term, and therefore provided the 
state with the ability to offer Medicaid coverage to a larger 
population of people.140 The district court analyzed the 
Secretary’s argument about fiscal sustainability as both an 
 
 136. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (stating that an agency “must 
employ the means Congress prescribed to tackle the problem it identified” in 
an act or program). 
 137. See id. at 146 (acknowledging the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s 
argument in favor of finding that financial independence is part of Medicaid’s 
objectives, but noting that the Secretary did not rely on these arguments in 
approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver program). 
 138. See id. at 148 (noting that the Secretary failed to weigh the costs of 
Kentucky HEALTH against the potential benefits in increasing beneficiary 
financial independence). 
 139. See Mango, supra note 120 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2018)) (finding 
that fiscal sustainability of the Medicaid program in general can be considered 
an objective of the Medicaid Act. 
 140. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 148 (discussing the Secretary’s 
argument that fiscal sustainability is a key component of the Medicaid Act 
because it enables states such as Kentucky to provide Medicaid coverage to 
expansion populations). 
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independent objective of Medicaid as well as a sub-objective of 
Medicaid coverage promotion.141 
(1) Fiscal Sustainability as an Independent Objective of the 
Medicaid Program 
Chevron deference is granted any time an agency interprets 
the objectives of a statute which the agency is charged with 
executing.142 The district court found that the word “objectives” 
as used in the text of the law was ambiguous, so the court moved 
to step two of the Chevron analysis.143 The district court looked 
to the statutory language to determine whether the Secretary’s 
interpretation of “objectives” was reasonable and concluded that 
the Secretary’s interpretation was permissible.144   
In addition to satisfying the Chevron test, however, the 
agency must also justify why approval of the particular Section 
1115 waiver program will advance the objective of fiscal 
sustainability and its potential adverse effect on the other 
objectives of Medicaid.145 The district court pointed to the 
Secretary’s lack of substantial evidence that Kentucky 
HEALTH would improve the fiscal sustainability of Medicaid.146 
Without this type of evidence, the Secretary’s approval of such 
 
 141. See id. (stating that the Secretary did not specify whether he saw 
fiscal sustainability as its own objective of the Medicaid program or as falling 
under the umbrella of another objective of the Medicaid program). 
 142. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(describing the appropriate two-step analysis for courts when evaluating 
agency interpretation of statutes). 
 143. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 149 (D.D.C. 2019) (stating that 
the Secretary satisfied the requirement that the word “objectives” in the 
statute is ambiguous). 
 144. See id. (finding that the word “practicable” in § 1396-1 is “at least a 
qualifier of the extent to which states must furnish medical assistance”); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018) (using the phrase “as far as practicable under 
the conditions in such State” to qualify the requirement that states must 
furnish medical assistance to needy populations). 
 145. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (reiterating that the Secretary 
cannot simply satisfy the Chevron test but must look closely at the effect of 
approving a particular Section 1115 waiver). 
 146. See id. at 149–50 (indicating that the Secretary must be able to back 
up his assertions of additional goals of the Medicaid Act with reasonable 
proof). 
124 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020) 
 
waiver programs is deemed arbitrary and capricious by the 
courts.147 
(2) Fiscal Sustainability as a Sub-Objective of Providing 
Medicaid Coverage 
Section 1115 focuses the Secretary’s evaluation of specific 
demonstration projects’ impact on furthering the objectives of 
Medicaid.148 The district court found that Section 1115 assumes 
a good-faith compliance with the larger Medicaid Act when 
permitting the Secretary to waive states’ compliance with 
certain parts of the Medicaid Act in order to carry out their 
waiver programs.149 In Stewart II, Kentucky threatened to 
de-expand Medicaid if its Section 1115 waiver was not 
approved.150 The court highlighted that the Secretary cannot 
move on evaluating whether Kentucky’s Section 1115 program 
promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act when the program 
did not have baseline compliance with the Medicaid Act.151 
Thus, the defendants’ argument that approval of Kentucky 
HEALTH promoted Medicaid coverage fails, since the 
alternative proposition was that Kentucky cease compliance 
with the Medicaid Act in total.152 
2. The Administrative Procedure Act 
In Stewart II, the district court also struck down the 
Secretary’s approval of Kentucky HEALTH on the grounds that 
 
 147. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 148. See § 1315 (focusing on the demonstration projects within the larger 
context of the Medicaid Act). 
 149. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (dismissing the defendants’ 
argument for Kentucky HEALTH approval because, if the program were not 
approved, Kentucky would allegedly de-expand its Medicaid program, which 
would not be a good-faith compliance with the Medicaid Act). 
 150. See id. at 153 (presenting Kentucky’s argument that, without the 
work requirements from Kentucky HEALTH, Kentucky would not be able to 
financially sustain its Medicaid expansion population). 
 151. See id. (finding that defendants’ argument lacked a limiting principle 
and that baseline compliance with the Medicaid Act is necessary for the 
Secretary’s approval of a waiver program to be reasonable). 
 152. See id. (“This coverage-promotion argument, in fact, does not depend 
on fiscal sustainability at all.”). 
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this approval was arbitrary and capricious.153 The 
Administrative Procedure Act154 provides that when a court is 
reviewing an agency action, the court shall “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”155 To determine whether an action is 
arbitrary and capricious, “the court must consider whether the 
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and 
whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”156 This 
evaluation also examines whether the Secretary followed the 
“necessary procedural requirements” when taking the agency 
action.157 Further, the reviewing court must only consider the 
grounds on which the agency made its decision; the court cannot 
substitute “what it considers to be a more adequate or proper 
basis” for the agency’s action.158 
 
 153. See id. at 131 (“As a consequence, once again finding the reapproval 
was both contrary to the Act and arbitrary and capricious, the Court will 
vacate it and remand to HHS for further review.”); see also Invented Purposes, 
supra note 51, at 118 (“Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s ‘arbitrary 
and capricious’ standard governing judicial review, the court concluded that 
its duty was to review the legality of the work experiment (known as Kentucky 
HEALTH) ‘as a whole,’ rather than approaching each experimental element 
piecemeal.”). 
 154. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–59, 701–06 (2018). 
 155. Id. § 706. 
 156. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971). See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (“[A] court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting Burlington 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
 157. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416 (adding 
that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is a narrow standard); see 
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise. 
 158. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating that, to 
maintain the proper separation of powers balance, a court must only consider 
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In this case, the court used the conclusion that the 
Secretary’s approval violated the Medicaid Act as evidence that 
the Secretary’s approval was arbitrary and capricious.159 The 
district court focused on the fact that the Secretary did not 
adequately consider the loss in Medicaid coverage for 
beneficiaries resulting from Kentucky HEALTH when making 
his approval determination.160 The district court pointed to the 
Secretary’s failure to weigh the alleged health benefits of 
Kentucky HEALTH against the concerning amount of coverage 
loss as evidence of the Secretary’s arbitrary and capricious 
decision.161 The district court noted that the Secretary also 
failed to weigh the alleged benefits of beneficiary financial 
independence against widespread coverage loss.162 The 
Secretary’s failure to consider coverage loss when approving 
Kentucky HEALTH indicated that the approval was arbitrary 
and capricious, notwithstanding the Secretary’s argument in 
favor of promoting Medicaid fiscal sustainability.163 
 
the rationale that an agency sets forth and may not read in the court’s own 
basis for an action). 
 159. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (finding that, since the 
Secretary did not adequately consider the objectives of the Medicaid Act as 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1315 in his approval of Kentucky HEALTH, the 
Secretary’s approval is arbitrary and capricious). 
 160. See id. at 140 (noting that the Secretary had not conducted the type 
of “reasoned decision-making” required of him regarding estimated coverage 
loss numbers); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (citing 
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)) 
(stating that an agency’s decision-making process must be reasoned, logical, 
and rational). 
 161. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (stating that the Secretary’s 
reasoning that Kentucky HEALTH promotes the health of Medicaid 
beneficiaries ignores the fact that Kentucky HEALTH will cause widespread 
Medicaid coverage loss, thus affecting the health of those beneficiaries). 
 162. See id. at 148 (“Even if some number of beneficiaries were to gain 
independence, the Secretary does not weigh the benefits of their 
self-sufficiency against the consequences of coverage loss, which would harm 
and undermine the financial self-sufficiency of others.”). 
 163. See id. (“[The Secretary] unreasonably prioritized program savings 
without weighing those against the consequences of lost coverage, rendering 
his determination arbitrary and capricious.”); see also Newton-Nations v. 
Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that approval of a Medicaid 
waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 1315 is arbitrary and capricious if the purpose of 
approval is to save the Medicaid program money). 
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B. Gresham v. Azar 
In 2017, Arkansas amended its existing Section 1115 
waiver to include the state’s work requirements program, 
Arkansas Works.164 The work requirement applied to members 
of the Medicaid expansion population aged nineteen to forty-
nine, requiring beneficiaries to record eighty hours per month of 
activities such as work, school, volunteering, or searching for a 
job.165 Failure to report satisfactory activities for three months 
would result in the beneficiary losing Medicaid coverage for the 
rest of the calendar year.166 However, many beneficiaries 
reported difficulty using the system Arkansas created for 
reporting work requirements, including having their accounts 
suspended for entering the wrong data, as well as basic 
technology illiteracy problems such as understanding how to 
create an online account and having regular access to a 
computer.167 Ultimately, over 18,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in 
Arkansas lost their coverage due to the work requirements 
rule.168 As a result, a group of Medicaid beneficiaries in 
Arkansas filed suit challenging the Secretary’s approval of 
Arkansas’s Section 1115 waiver.169 
 
 164. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing 
background on Arkansas’s work requirements program). 
 165. See Erin Brantley & Leighton Ku, A First Glance at Medicaid Work 
Requirements in Arkansas: More Than One-Quarter Did Not Meet 
Requirement, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/6RSR-
9VBT?type=image (discussing the specific reporting requirements to satisfy 
the program’s work requirements). 
 166. See id. (noting the implications of failing to properly report qualifying 
activities). 
 167. See Jacqueline Froelich, In Arkansas, Thousands of People Have Lost 
Medicaid Coverage Over New Work Requirements, NPR (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/CT5U-K5VG (highlighting the difficulty in the logistics of 
implementing the work requirements program and the effect these difficulties 
have on Medicaid coverage). 
 168. See Abby Goodnough, Appeals Court Rejects Trump Medicaid Work 
Requirements in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/FXE6-
TXKU (explaining the drastic loss in coverage experienced by Arkansas 
Medicaid beneficiaries). For a more thorough evaluation of Arkansas’s 
Medicaid work requirements program, see Brantley & Ku, supra note 165 
(analyzing the impact of Arkansas’s Section 1115 work requirements waiver 
on the Medicaid population before the program was halted). 
 169. See Gresham I, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing 
the plaintiffs’ background in bringing this case). 
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The court of appeals consolidated the appeals for both 
Stewart II and Gresham I into Gresham II, although Kentucky 
voluntarily dismissed its appeal after oral arguments.170 Judge 
David Sentelle, writing the unanimous opinion, first established 
that the Secretary’s approval of Section 1115 waivers is subject 
to judicial review.171 The court then addressed whether the 
district court correctly identified the objectives of the Medicaid 
Act and whether the Secretary’s approval of Arkansas’s Section 
1115 violated the APA.172 
1. The Medicaid Act 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding 
that the primary objective of Medicaid is to provide health care 
coverage.173 In making this ruling, the court of appeals 
emphasized that at least four other courts of appeals as well as 
the United States Supreme Court had all made similar findings 
about the objective of Medicaid.174 In the letter initially 
 
 170. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 96–97 (providing the procedural history 
for the case); see also Letter from Andy Beshear, Gov., Ky., to Andrea Casart, 
Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion Demonstrations, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/6LNR-UP9U (PDF) (stating 
that, due to Kentucky’s gubernatorial election resulting in a new governor, the 
state would be terminating its work requirements program). 
 171. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 98 (rejecting the government’s argument 
that courts cannot review the Secretary’s approval of Section 1115 waivers); 
see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) 
(stating that judicial review is appropriate in all cases except where Congress 
has expressly prohibited it). 
 172. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 99 (stating that the court will review the 
district court’s decision de novo). 
 173. See id. (agreeing with the district court that Section 1115 waivers 
should be measured against whether they promote health care coverage). 
 174. See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 
275 (2006) (“The Medicaid program . . . provides joint federal and state 
funding of medical care for individuals who cannot afford to pay their own 
medical costs.”); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F. 3d 66, 
75 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the main purpose of Medicaid is to provide 
medical services to those who cannot provide for themselves); W. Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F. 2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We recognize, of course, 
that the primary purpose of Medicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social 
objective of granting health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”); Price 
v. Medicaid Dir., 838 F. 3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that Medicaid 
permits the government to give money to states to pay for the medical costs of 
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approving Arkansas Works, CMS evaluated Arkansas Works 
against three additional objectives of Medicaid similar to those 
the district court addressed in Stewart II.175 The court of appeals 
dismissed these alternate objectives as lacking textual support 
in the Medicaid Act.176 Rather, the statute only calls for the 
“furnish[ing of] medical assistance” to the poor.177 Additionally, 
the court of appeals noted that Congress amended several social 
welfare programs in the 1990s to include work requirements, 
including TANF.178 Given that Congress did not similarly 
amend Medicaid at this time, Congress did not intend for 
Medicaid to have work requirements.179 Thus, the court of 
appeals held that the primary objective of Medicaid is providing 
health care coverage without any additional restrictions.180 
2. The Administrative Procedure Act 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding 
that the Secretary’s approval of the Section 1115 work 
requirements waiver was arbitrary and capricious.181  When 
deciding whether to approve a waiver or not, the Secretary must 
show that he has considered all “important aspect[s] of the 
 
needy people); Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F. 3d 1029, 1031 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (describing Medicaid as a federal grant program that provides 
medical services to those who cannot afford them). 
 175. See Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., to Asa Hutchinson, Governor, Arkansas, (March 5, 2018), https://
perma.cc/DF38-7GUB (PDF) (identifying the objectives of the Medicaid Act as 
improving health outcomes, addressing factors that affect health outcomes, 
and engaging beneficiaries in their own care). 
 176. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“These three 
alternative objectives all point to better health outcomes as the objective of 
Medicaid, but that alternative objective lacks textual support. Indeed, the 
statute makes no mention of that objective.”). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). 
 178. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102 (citing Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103, 
§ 407, 110 Stat. 2105, 2129–34) (stating that Congress has a history of 
amending social welfare programs to implement work requirements). 
 179. See id. (discussing Congressional intent behind amending certain 
social welfare programs). 
 180. See id. (affirming the district court’s ruling in Stewart II). 
 181. See id. (finding that the Secretary’s failure to consider coverage loss 
renders his approval arbitrary and capricious). 
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problem.”182 In Gresham II, the court focused on the Secretary’s 
failure to consider the impact of Arkansas Works on beneficiary 
coverage, specifically whether the waiver program would cause 
coverage loss.183 The court of appeals viewed coverage loss as 
directly related to the Medicaid objective of providing health 
care coverage, and found that the Secretary provided no 
in-depth analysis regarding this objective.184 Instead, the 
Secretary’s approval centered around the alternative objectives 
of Medicaid he identified, such as promoting beneficiaries’ 
engagement with their health care.185 Since the Secretary 
disregarded the Section 1115 waiver program’s impact on 
beneficiaries’ health care coverage, the court of appeals held 
that the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious.186 
The court of appeals’ opinion in Gresham II is particularly 
notable because Judge David Sentelle authored the opinion.187 
Judge Sentelle is often referred to as “one of the most 
conservative judges in the country” and serves as a mentor to 
his prior clerk Justice Neil Gorsuch.188 Some legal scholars posit 
that the Trump Administration may abandon Section 1115 
programs such as Arkansas Works because such a respected 
 
 182. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (discussing reasons why a court may find an agency action 
arbitrary and capricious). 
 183. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 103 (noting that the Secretary dismissed 
the concerns about coverage loss rather than engage directly with the issue). 
 184. See id. (“In total, the Secretary’s analysis of the substantial and 
important problem is to note the concerns of others and dismiss those concerns 
in a handful of conclusory sentences.”). 
 185. See Verma, supra note 175 (evaluating Arkansas Works based on 
alternative measures rather than focusing on the program’s effect on Medicaid 
coverage). 
 186. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 104 (holding that it is arbitrary and 
capricious to “prioritize non-statutory objectives to the exclusion of the 
statutory purpose”). 
 187. See id. at 94 (noting the three judges who heard the case and the judge 
who authored the opinion). 
 188. Ian Millhiser, Trump Just Got Bad News From Neil Gorsuch’s Mentor 
in a Big Medicaid Case, VOX (Feb. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/P5PK-X39N; see 
Alexander Somodevilla & Sara Rosenbaum, Inside the D.C. Circuit’s Opinion 
in Gresham v. Azar, HEALTH AFF. (Feb 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/M5YK-
T76A?type=image (referring to Judge Sentelle as one of the most conservative 
members of the D.C. Circuit). 
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conservative judge issued a strong condemnation of the 
program.189 
V. Application of Current Case Law to Amendment 42 and the 
Healthy Adult Opportunity Program 
The courts’ rulings in Stewart II and Gresham II are 
important because they provide a framework for courts to use 
when faced with future challenges to the Secretary’s Section 
1115 waiver authority.190 This Note will first apply the 
reasoning in Stewart II and Gresham II to Amendment 42.191 
Next, this Note will turn to the Trump Administration’s recently 
released guidance to states on drafting Section 1115 waivers 
asking for Medicaid block grants.192 Under the Gresham II 
court’s logic, the Secretary should not approve either 
Amendment 42 or HAO waivers because such approval would 
be unlawful and immediately struck down by the courts.193 
A. Amendment 42 
1. Promoting the Objectives of Medicaid 
Section 1115 waivers must further the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act.194 The Gresham II court noted that the principal 
 
 189. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (hypothesizing about 
the Trump Administration’s next move regarding Section 1115 work 
requirements programs). 
 190. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (suggesting that CMS’ 
solicitation of block grant proposals, and states submission of such proposals, 
is “courting yet another legal battle” in light of Stewart). 
 191. See Tony Pugh, Tennessee Seeks Federal Approval to Block Grant 
Medicaid Program, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/SN3S-
WGTC (reporting that Tennessee filed its proposal with CMS on November 
20, 2019 and that CMS approval of the proposal would be the first of its kind). 
 192. See Lynch, supra note 14 (explaining that CMS will now support state 
proposals to receive Medicaid as a block grant through Section 1115 waiver 
programs). 
 193. See Alice Hall-Partyka et al., Tennessee Proposes First of Its Kind 
Block Grant Program for Medicaid, C&M HEALTH L. (Sept 24, 2019), https://
perma.cc/YN42-FGBR (“Approval of Tennessee’s proposal would likely trigger 
similar litigation against CMS.”). 
 194. See infra Part IV and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1315 
(2018) (mandating that the Secretary only approve demonstration projects 
that “are likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Medicaid Act). 
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objective of the Medicaid Act is to provide medical assistance to 
needy populations.195 This objective has two elements: whether 
the project causes beneficiaries to lose coverage and whether the 
project promotes Medicaid coverage.196 
The experimental nature of Amendment 42 does not 
“sanction a demonstration that would result in significant 
coverage loss, nor does it relieve the Secretary of his obligation 
to consider the magnitude of coverage loss.”197 When considering 
whether to approve Amendment 42, the Secretary must 
adequately consider the impact of the proposal on beneficiary 
coverage.198 However, Amendment 42 does not explicitly 
address the potential impact of the demonstration project on 
enrollment for current beneficiaries.199 In fact, Amendment 42 
requests that Tennessee be preemptively exempted from any 
federal coverage mandate that may arise during the lifetime of 
the demonstration project.200 The proposal even goes so far as to 
acknowledge that Tennessee is not providing the federal 
government with specific information and metrics about the 
impact of Amendment 42 on beneficiary coverage.201 Given the 
 
 195. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that the 
primary objective of Medicaid is to provide medical assistance). 
 196. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 140 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting 
Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C. 2018)) (restating the district 
court’s findings from the previous proceeding about the elements of the first 
objective of the Medicaid Act). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Humane Soc’y v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating 
that the Secretary must consider all “salient factors” when making an agency 
decision). 
 199. Compare An Update, supra note 76 (noting that the proposal does not 
address the potential impact of Amendment 42 on current beneficiaries), with 
Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (stating that Kentucky provided an 
estimated beneficiary coverage loss should the state’s Section 1115 waiver 
take effect); see also Perkins, supra note 90 (“[T]he document is extremely 
vague on the specifics of what the State is proposing to do and how those 
proposals will affect stakeholders, from enrollees to managed care 
organizations.”). 
 200. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 12 (“[I]t is expected that 
Tennessee will be exempt from any new federal mandates over the life of the 
demonstration that could have a material impact on the state’s Medicaid 
expenditures (e.g., mandates concerning eligibility or covered benefits).”). 
 201. See id. at 13 (“[I]t is not the intention of the state to enumerate in 
detail in this document every innovation, reform, or policy change that might 
take place over the life of the demonstration.”). 
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lack of specific information about the potential loss of coverage 
beneficiaries would face due to Amendment 42, the Secretary 
should not approve Tennessee’s proposal.202 
The second element in furnishing medical assistance is 
whether the Section 1115 waiver program promotes Medicaid 
coverage.203 In the proposal, Tennessee provides a list of alleged 
health reform benefits of shifting to a block grant model, but 
notably does not include coverage expansion as one such 
benefit.204 Tennessee does mention “covering additional needy 
individuals” as a priority of Amendment 42, but provides no 
additional details on how exactly the state plans to achieve this 
goal.205 Thus, the Secretary cannot approve Amendment 42 on 
the grounds that the demonstration project promotes Medicaid 
coverage because Tennessee has given the Secretary little 
information and evidence to evaluate.206 
When reviewing Amendment 42 for approval, the Secretary 
should not consider whether the proposal promotes other 
alternative objectives identified by the Secretary.207 The 
Gresham II court did not directly address the Stewart II court’s 
consideration of fiscal sustainability as another potential 
 
 202. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102 (citing the Secretary’s failure to 
account for the significant coverage loss as a crucial error). 
 203. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that 
coverage promotion is an important component of providing medical 
assistance to needy populations). 
 204. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 3 (providing several 
“core health care reform principles” that the state would expand under the 
Medicaid block grant). 
 205. See id. at 24 (listing several priorities for the demonstration project). 
 206. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (discussing the importance of 
the Secretary’s ability to evaluate whether or not a Section 1115 
demonstration project promotes Medicaid coverage); see also Gresham II, 950 
F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that, notwithstanding the fact that 
Arkansas did not provide any coverage loss analysis, the Secretary had enough 
information to realize that such an analysis was required). 
 207. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 100–01 (dismissing the Secretary’s 
evaluation of Arkansas Works against alternative objectives of Medicaid as 
unrelated to the primary objective of Medicaid); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 
125, 138 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that promotion of either health or financial 
independence is not a valid objective of the Medicaid Act). 
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objective of Medicaid.208 Under the Stewart II ruling, however, 
the Secretary may be able to consider Amendment 42’s impact 
on the fiscal sustainability on Tennessee’s Medicaid program 
when evaluating whether to approve the project or not.209 
One of the main goals of Amendment 42 is to “demonstrate 
that an alternative model of federal participation in state 
Medicaid programs will lead to Medicaid programs that are 
more financially sustainable for states and the federal 
government . . . .”210 The proposed block grant model will permit 
Tennessee to reinvest unspent federal dollars back into “the 
state’s needy populations.”211 However, other than a few 
sentences naming fiscal sustainability of Medicaid as a goal of 
Amendment 42, Tennessee provides no specific details for the 
Secretary on how precisely Amendment 42 will make Medicaid 
more sustainable.212 As the court stated in Stewart II, the 
Secretary “must give an adequate explanation” for why 
Amendment 42 supports the objectives of the Medicaid Act that 
is “supported by substantial evidence.”213 Even if Tennessee 
provided more information about the fiscal sustainability 
objective, the Secretary would still be required to weigh this 
positive against potential coverage loss from Amendment 42.214 
Tennessee contends that the format of the block grant 
encourages the state to save money because any savings are 
 
 208. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 98–99 (stating that the court granted 
Kentucky’s motion to dismiss the Stewart II appeal and so the court of appeals 
never reached the questions presented in that case about fiscal sustainability); 
see also Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (noting that the court of 
appeals did not consider the fiscal sustainability argument as it was not raised 
in the Arkansas case). 
 209. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (“Defendants may, as a result, 
take into account fiscal sustainability in determining under § 1315 whether a 
demonstration project promotes the objectives of the [Medicaid] Act.”). 
 210. TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 26. 
 211. See id. at 4 (describing the proposed incentives for the state to wisely 
spend its Medicaid dollars under the block grant model). 
 212. See An Update, supra note 76 (noting that Tennessee’s proposal 
provides little detail on how the state will accomplish its goals). 
 213. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149. 
 214. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 103 (finding that the Secretary did not 
engage in adequate analysis regarding potential coverage loss); Stewart II, 366 
F. Supp. 3d at 149 (stating that the Secretary must do more than identify an 
objective of Medicaid, he must show how the demonstration project specifically 
furthers that objective). 
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split between the state and the federal government.215 However, 
opponents of Amendment 42 argue that the shared savings 
model incentivizes Tennessee to “cut Medicaid benefits and 
services.”216 Any such cuts should prominently factor into the 
Secretary’s balancing test in considering whether Tennessee’s 
promotion of fiscal sustainability meets the requirement that 
Section 1115 waivers must further the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act.217 
2. The Administrative Procedure Act 
As discussed previously,218 the Secretary should not 
approve Amendment 42 or similar block grant Section 1115 
waivers because they do not further the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act.219 If the Secretary were to approve a 
demonstration project such as Amendment 42, the courts would 
likely strike down such an approval as arbitrary and capricious 
because the demonstration project does not further the 
objectives of the Medicaid Act.220 The Secretary would have to 
prove to the court that, in making his decision to approve 
Amendment 42, he properly considered “the relevant factors” 
 
 215. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (“Tennessee proposes 
that in any year in which the state underspends its block grant, the state and 
the federal government share in the resulting savings.”). 
 216. See Pugh, supra note 191 (providing potential cuts Tennessee may 
make to Medicaid services due to the structure of the block grant). 
 217. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that the 
Secretary disregarded the primary objective of Medicaid in his approval of 
Arkansas Works); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (“[T]he Secretary must 
engage in considered analysis of the fiscal-sustainability concern . . . .”); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (stating that the Secretary’s judgment determines 
whether a demonstration project furthers the objectives of the Medicaid Act). 
 218. See supra Part IV. 
 219. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (arguing that any block grant 
model would violate the objectives of the Medicaid Act because it would 
incentivize disenrolling beneficiaries from the program). 
 220. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 104 (stating that to avoid a finding of 
arbitrary and capricious review, the Secretary needs to analyze the loss of 
beneficiary coverage); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2019) 
(using the Secretary’s failure to properly consider the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act as evidence that the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky’s waiver 
was arbitrary and capricious). 
136 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020) 
 
and available data.221 Because Tennessee provided such sparse 
details about Amendment 42’s potential impact on Medicaid 
coverage, as well as how Amendment 42 would promote fiscal 
sustainability, the Secretary would find it difficult to produce a 
robust record and appropriately weigh the factors relevant to 
his approval.222 
B. Healthy Adult Opportunity Waiver Program 
1. Promoting the Objectives of the Medicaid Act 
In the Letter to State Medicaid Directors concerning the 
HAO program, CMS specifically calls for states to submit 
proposals for Section 1115 block grant projects that “are likely 
to assist in promoting the objectives of the Medicaid 
program.”223 Instead of stating that the objective of Medicaid is 
to provide medical assistance to needy populations,224 the letter 
identifies the objective of Medicaid as “the furnishing of medical 
assistance in a manner that promotes the sustainability of 
government health care spending . . . .”225 However, the court in 
Gresham II emphasized that the text of the Medicaid Act 
“specifically addresses only coverage” as the objective of statute, 
and to go beyond this clear objective is not permitted.226 
Although the district court in Stewart II acknowledged that 
 
 221. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1971) (requiring the Secretary to properly consider the evidence before 
him when making an agency decision). 
 222. See Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(finding the Secretary’s approval of a Section 1115 waiver arbitrary and 
capricious because the Secretary produced no record indicating that they had 
actually made findings about the program’s impact on the objectives of the 
Medicaid Act); see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the Secretary needs to provide evidence that they considered the 
impact of the Section 1115 waiver project on the state’s Medicaid population). 
 223. See Lynch, supra note 14 (discussing the requirements for successful 
Section 1115 demonstration projects). 
 224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (discussing the objective of the Medicaid 
Act). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 100–01 (refusing to recognize the 
Secretary’s identified additional objectives of Medicaid as legitimate because 
Congress intended for providing medical coverage to be the primary Medicaid 
objective). 
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fiscal sustainability may be an objective that the Secretary can 
consider,227 the court of appeals did not consider this issue on 
appeal.228 The HAO letter’s failure to specify the provision of 
health coverage to low-income individuals as the objective of 
Medicaid indicates that a court should strike down any HAO 
approvals.229 As the Stewart II court addressed, the effect of the 
Section 1115 program on beneficiary coverage is a key aspect of 
promoting the objective of Medicaid.230 
Importantly, HAO initiatives only apply to adults who are 
not already eligible for Medicaid under a state’s normal 
Medicaid plan, such as the Medicaid expansion population.231 
For some states, the ability to receive certain portions of 
Medicaid as a block grant may incentivize them to expand 
Medicaid, thus providing health coverage to more individuals 
and promoting the objective of Medicaid.232 However, the 
Kentucky HEALTH work requirements also applied to the 
expansion population and the district court still struck the 
waiver down as violating the objectives of Medicaid due to the 
resulting coverage loss.233 If HAO demonstration projects also 
result in significant coverage loss, they would similarly be 
struck down by the courts regardless of which Medicaid 
 
 227. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (finding that the Secretary’s 
consideration of fiscal sustainability was not an unreasonable interpretation 
of Medicaid’s objectives). 
 228. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 189 (stating that fiscal 
sustainability may be a legitimate argument since the court of appeals did not 
definitively rule on this issue). 
 229. See Rudowitz et al., supra note 68 (“[Work requirements] lawsuits 
have been decided based on the finding that the primary objective of the 
Medicaid program is to provide affordable coverage to low-income people, 
which is not highlighted as a program objective for the HAOs.”). 
 230. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (discussing the role of 
beneficiary coverage in furnishing medical assistance to the needy). 
 231. See Lynch, supra note 14 (“We expect that coverage under an HAO 
demonstration will focus on adults under age 65 who are not eligible for 
coverage under the state plan.”). 
 232. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (stating that the purpose of Medicaid is 
to provide coverage to needy populations). 
 233. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 138 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that 
the objective of Medicaid applies equally to both the non-expansion and 
expansion population). 
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population the project applied to.234 The coverage loss could 
result from states who seek to transition an existing Medicaid 
population to an HAO demonstration project.235 Additionally, 
the HAO demonstration project itself could implement such 
changes as capping total Medicaid enrollment, imposing 
cost-sharing requirements on beneficiaries, restricting the 
drugs covered by Medicaid, and restricting Medicaid coverage to 
those with certain medical diagnoses.236 Further, under the 
HAO initiative states can also impose work requirements, 
eliminate retroactive eligibility, and suspend coverage for those 
beneficiaries who do not pay their premiums.237 While the letter 
includes a process for “transitioning existing Section 1115 
demonstrations into a state’s HAO demonstration,” the letter 
does not provide any information about protecting against 
coverage loss.238 
2. Administrative Procedure Act 
As the court stated in Gresham II, the failure of CMS and 
the Secretary to account for coverage loss ultimately rendered 
approval of such Section 1115 waiver programs arbitrary and 
capricious.239 To avoid such an outcome, the Secretary would 
have to carefully consider data submitted by states with their 
HAO program proposals about the programs’ potential impact 
 
 234. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he loss of 
coverage for beneficiaries is an important aspect of the demonstration 
approval because coverage is a principal objective of Medicaid . . . .”). 
 235. See Lynch, supra note 14 (stating that states can transfer existing 
Medicaid beneficiaries to this new program). 
 236. See Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Trump Administration Calls It 
‘Healthy Adult Opportunity.’ Critics Call It Less Medicaid, WASH. POST (Jan. 
31, 2020, 7:18 AM), https://perma.cc/RES9-CG59 (discussing the significant 
changes an HAO demonstration could impose on Medicaid beneficiaries). 
 237. See Rudowitz, et al., supra note 68 (discussing ways in which the HAO 
program permits states to limit Medicaid coverage). 
 238. See Lynch, supra note 14 (providing guidance on transitioning 
coverage from one Section 1115 demonstration to another, but failing to 
suggest safeguards against significant coverage loss). 
 239. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102–03 (focusing on the Secretary’s 
failure to analyze potential coverage loss from Arkansas Works). 
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on coverage.240 However, the HAO letter does not specifically 
encourage states to analyze and present such data to the 
Secretary, resulting in courts ruling that any approval of an 
HAO program is arbitrary and capricious.241 
VI. Conclusion 
If current health care and political trends continue, many 
states are likely to submit controversial Section 1115 proposals 
that potentially violate the Medicaid Act as interpreted in 
Stewart II and Gresham II.242 By ruling against both Arkansas’s 
and Kentucky’s Section 1115 waivers, the courts have taken a 
clear stance on which types of proposals are permissible and 
which are not.243 The court ruling had a profound effect on the 
Medicaid landscape in Kentucky, as the current governor has 
terminated the Kentucky HEALTH program based on the 
court’s decision.244 The courts should continue to enforce the 
Medicaid Act and the APA and strike down any Section 1115 
proposals seeking to convert Medicaid into a block grant.245 
Although the Medicaid Act and Section 1115 waivers permit a 
 
 240. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1971) (stating that the Secretary must evaluate relevant data in making 
a decision). 
 241. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (noting that any 
coverage losses stemming from approval of a Section 1115 program should be 
central to the Secretary’s decision to approve such a program). 
 242. See Lynch, supra note 14 (inviting states to apply for Section 1115 
waivers that would convert Medicaid into a block grant program); see also 
Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 96 (holding that the Secretary’s approval of these 
Section 1115 waivers is arbitrary and capricious); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 
at 131 (finding that the Secretary’s action in approving the Section 1115 
waiver violates the Medicaid Act). 
 243. See Fishman & Weissfeld, supra note 65 (discussing the impact of the 
successful work requirements litigation on other Section 1115 waiver 
proposals). 
 244. See Beshear, supra note 170 (terminating the Kentucky HEALTH 
demonstration project based on the ruling in Stewart v. Azar). 
 245. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding the 
Secretary’s analysis of the impact of Arkansas Works on beneficiary coverage 
to be no more than a few sentences); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131 
(D.D.C. 2019) (finding that, since Kentucky HEALTH did not advance the 
objectives of the Medicaid Act, the Secretary’s approval of the program was 
arbitrary and capricious). 
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degree of innovation and flexibility,246 it is up to the courts to 
protect the interests of Medicaid beneficiaries and ensure that 
any decisions made by the Secretary are based on a robust 
record that ensures adequate coverage protection.247 Otherwise, 
beneficiaries like six year-old Asher will be left without 
medically necessary treatment and their families will be forced 
into financial hardship.248 
 
 
 246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (noting that Section 1115 programs are 
experimental in nature). 
 247. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (stating that the Secretary 
failed to provide enough detail about how Kentucky HEALTH would advance 
coverage promotion). 
 248. See Bliss, supra note 2 (stating that Asher, after contracting a serious 
respiratory illness due to her disabilities, received a $1.8 million medical bill 
from her required medical treatments). 
